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Abstract: While the theses that (1) human beings are primarily passional 
creatures and that (2) religion is fundamentally a product of our sensible nature are 
both closely linked to David Hume, Hume’s contemporary Henry Home, Lord Kames 
(1696- 1782), also defended them and explored their implications. Importantly,
Kames does not draw the same sceptical conclusions as does Hume. Employing 
a sophisticated account of the rationality of what he calls the ‘sensitive branch’ 
of human nature, Kames argues that religion plays a central role in the development 
and perfection of human life.
The two theses that (1) human beings are fundamentally creatures of 
passion and sentim ent rather than of reason, and that (2) religion is, therefore, 
primarily a product of this emotive side of human nature, are both indelibly 
linked with the name of David Hume. Both are shared by H um e’s contemporary, 
occasional correspondent, and distant cousin Henry Home, Lord Kames 
(1696- 1782), who, like Hume, fell foul of the Kirk for his religious views.1 However, 
the lesson that Kames draws from these claims, and the use he makes of them  
in constructing his own elaborate philosophical anthropology, are strikingly 
different from H um e’s conclusions. For Hume, the upshot of these two claims is 
famously captured in his Natural History o f  Religion (1757):
Survey most nations and most ages. Examine the religious principles, which have, in 
fact, prevailed in the world. You will scarcely be persuaded, that they are any thing but 
sick m en’s dreams. Or perhaps will regard them  more as the playsome whimsies of 
monkeys in hum an shape, than the serious, positive, dogmatical assertions of a being 
who dignifies himself with the nam e of rational.2
Lord Kames, on the other hand, in his Essays on the Principles o f  M orality and  
Natural Religion (1751) [hereafter EPM], defends religion from sceptical attack. 
In his Sketches o f th e  History o f  Man (1774) [hereafter SHM], a voluminous
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tour-de-force of eighteenth-century anthropology, he follows Hume in exploring 
the development of religious ideas over the course of human history, likewise 
according passion and sensibility primary explanatory roles, yet still maintaining 
the positive view expressed in EPM.3 Like Hume, Kames seeks to challenge the 
pretensions of rationalists. Unlike Hume, he is not committed to the idea that 
doing so relegates religion to the domain of irrational instinct.4
While Kames was widely respected during his lifetime and for decades after­
wards, in his native Scotland, in North America, and in Germany, his work is 
all but ignored today outside specialist circles. My principal aim in this essay is 
to argue that Kames deserves more serious attention as an innovator in the 
development of a naturalistic understanding of religion. Recent years have seen  
a revival of scholarly interest in the history of the m odem  study of religion, and in 
its origins in the eighteenth-century ‘science of m an ’.5 Ian Ross has sketched 
Karnes’s place within this tradition, the origins of which, like many scholars, he 
locates in the work of Lord Herbert of Cherbury.6 At the same time, philosophers 
have begun to reconsider the positive role played by what Kames calls the 
‘sensitive branch’ of human nature, including, in particular, em otion .7 Karnes’s 
account of religion, embedded within a larger account of the central role played 
by the ‘ sensitive branch ’ in social life and cognition, constitutes an interesting, 
yet neglected, point of historical reference for contemporary scholars pursuing 
these lines of enquiry.
My argument for the importance of Karnes’s work takes the form of a recon­
struction of his position that pays special attention to his multi-dimensional 
account of the rationality of the ‘ sensitive branch’. I begin, first o f all, by showing 
Karnes’s com m itm ent to the Humean thesis that human beings are primarily 
creatures of passion and sentiment. I then go on to describe his account (in both 
EPM, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, SHM) o f how religion is best understood  
as a product of the ‘sensitive branch’. Having established this com m on ground 
between Kames and Hume, I go on to show why Kames drew different con­
clusions from these claims. Beginning with EPM, I show how Kames develops 
a functional-teleological account of the ‘sensitive branch’ and its products, 
according to which the em otions ‘fit’ us into our environments and help us to 
realize the characteristic ends of our nature. Next, I turn to Karnes’s more detailed 
discussion in the Elements o f  Criticism  (1762) [hereafter E Q , perhaps his most 
influential work, which went through five editions during his own lifetime, as well 
as five German editions between 1763 and 1791, and which impacted discussions 
in aesthetics well into the nineteenth century. In EC, Kames reiterates his func- 
tional-teleological account, while adding som e important new considerations. 
First, Kames argues that (1) passions and em otions make rational agency possible, 
that (2) they are cognitive responses to features of the world, that (3) they are 
indispensable to rational cognition in general, and that (4) they are capable of 
both culture and rational assessment.
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Ian Ross, in his classic intellectual biography of Kames, provides an 
elegant statement of the foundation of his philosophical outlook: ‘Home may be 
said to participate in that silent eighteenth-century revolution which rejected 
m an’s concept of him self as essentially rational and substituted that of the 
creature driven by appetites whose behaviour was affected by the environment 
to which he was exposed. ’8 Kames belongs firmly in the sentimentalist tradition 
derived from Shaftesbury, alongside George Turnbull (1698- 1748), Francis 
Hutcheson (1694- 1746), Adam Smith (1723- 1790), and, of course, Hume. He also 
represents a pivot between this tradition and its successor in the Common 
Sense school of Reid, who was quite explicitly indebted to Kames. Ross’s 
characterization is, therefore, quite accurate. At the same time, however, this 
characterization seem s to accept a dualism between rationality and the ‘ sensitive 
branch ’ that, as will be shown below, Kames is keen to undercut.
Kames’s com m itm ent to the explanatory primacy of the ‘ sensitive branch ’ is 
advertised at the very beginning of EPM, ‘w here’, he observes, ‘it is occasionally 
shown, that our reasonings on som e of the m ost important subjects, rest ulti­
mately upon sense and feeling’ (EPM, 3)-9 It is important that Kames phrases the 
claim in the way he does. That it is our ‘reasonings’ that are grounded in ‘sense 
and feeling’ suggests, among other things, that the latter play a central role in 
cognition. His com m itm ent to the primacy of the ‘ sensitive branch ’ leads him, 
for example, to follow Hutcheson in rejecting Clarke’s rationalist moral philos­
ophy. On Clarke’s view, reason discerns the essential relations comprising the 
physical and spiritual worlds. Our duty, then, is to co-ordinate our actions or to 
make them ‘fit’ with these essential relations. Kames expresses his reservations 
about Clarke’s position as follows:
The Doctor’s error is a comm on one, that he endeavours to substitute reason in place 
of sentiment. The fitness of worshipping our Creator was obvious to him, as it is to
every person, because it is founded on our very nature.......His only mistake is, that,
overlooking the law written in his own heart, he vainly imagines that his metaphysical 
argum ent is just, because the consequences he draws from it happens to be true.
(EPM, 69)
One of the more telling statements of Kames’s com m itm ent to the primacy 
of the ‘sensitive branch’ comes, not surprisingly, from a work dedicated to 
analysing this crucial part of human nature, EC. Kames writes:
Man is superior to the brute, not more by his rational faculties, than  by his senses.
With respect to external senses, brutes probably yield not to men; and they may also 
have some obscure perception of beauty: but the more delicate senses of regularity, 
order, uniformity, and congruity, being connected with morality and religion, are 
reserved to dignify the chief of the terrestrial creation. Upon that account, no 
discipline is more suitable to man, nor more congruous to the dignity of his nature, 
than that which refines his taste, and leads him  to distinguish in  every
T h e  p r im a c y  o f  th e  ‘ s e n s itiv e  b r a n c h ’
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subject, what is regular, what is orderly, what is suitable, and what is fit and 
proper. {EC, 233)10
Here, Kames turns his back on the ancient tradition of defining human beings as 
rational animals and of grounding the dignity of human nature on its intellectual 
element. For Kames, all of the distinctive achievements of humanity, the 
arts, sciences, morality, and, importantly, religion, rest upon our more ‘ delicate 
sen ses’. His goal in works like EPM  and SHM  is to develop the ramifications of 
this perspective in domains as diverse as logic, epistemology, morality, political 
theory, and philosophy of religion.
What, more precisely, does Kames m ean by what he calls the ‘ sensitive branch ’ 
of our natures ?u Like Locke and Hutcheson, Kames accepts the empiricist thesis 
that all of our ideas are derived from the senses, and that a distinction can be 
drawn between our ‘external’ and ‘internal’ senses {EPM, 149). Like Hutcheson, 
Kames does not draw any rigid line between the more purely cognitive function 
of these senses and their role in producing affective responses.12 As he makes 
clear in EC, the senses include capacities for em otion and passion {EC, 32). 
Already in EPM, Kames envisions the senses as cognitive-cum-affective organs: 
‘As we are placed in a great world, surrounded with beings and things, some 
beneficial, som e hurtful; we are so constituted, that scarce any object is in­
different to us: it either gives pleasure or pain’ {EPM, 26). The ‘sensitive branch’ 
of human nature, therefore, is the totality of our fundamental cognitive and 
affective faculties. It comprises the m ost basic level at which we respond to the 
world. But the ‘sensitive branch’ is also the locus of more distinctively human  
responses to the world: the perception of regularity and order, of aesthetic and 
moral value, and of the existence and nature of God.
R eligio n  a n d  th e  ‘ sen sitive  b r a n c h ’ o f h u m a n  n a tu re
Like m ost of his contemporaries (with the possible exception of Hume), 
Kames takes religion to be a more or less universal feature of all human societies 
{EPM, 205- 206). His task in EPM  is twofold: first, to show that belief in God 
(natural religion) is rationally justified, and second, to explain how it is that 
this more or less universal conviction com es to be. Kames holds that, while 
arguments (specifically, a posteriori arguments) establish the existence of God 
beyond reasonable doubt, such arguments do not explain human religiosity. The 
approximate universality of religion forces the conclusion that ‘ the Deity hath 
manifested him self to us by principles wrought into our nature’ {EPM, 206). 
Which principles are these? Kames writes:
At the same time, to found our knowledge of the Deity upon reasoning solely, is not 
agreeable to the analogy of nature. We depend not on abstract reasoning, 
nor indeed on any reasoning, for unfolding our duty to our fellow creatures: it is 
engraved upon the table of our hearts. We adapt our actions to the course of nature,
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by mere instinct, without reasoning, or even experience. Therefore, if analogy can be 
relied on, it ought to be thought that God will discover himself to us, in some such 
m anner as may take in all mankind, the vulgar and illiterate as well as the deep-thinking 
philosopher. (EPM, 201)
The same suspicion of rationalism evidenced in Kames’s criticisms of Clarke’s 
moral theory is clearly present in this passage. Reason, Kames holds, is just not 
the sort of thing that could he counted on  either to disclose to us our duties or to 
produce the idea of God and the conviction of God’s existence. A proper account 
of human religion must therefore seek its foundations in the ‘sensitive branch’ 
of human nature. Kames is therefore committed to a broadly ‘sentim entalist’ 
account of religion.13 The crucial step in such an account is suggested in the 
following remarks: ‘Every thing must appear gloomy, dismal, and disjointed 
without a Deity to unite this world of beings into one beautiful and harmonious 
system ’ (EPM, 204). In other words, som e fact about our emotional constitution  
accounts for the universality of religion. Kames elaborates:
Man, at the same time, by his taste for beauty, regularity, and order, is fitted for 
contemplating the wisdom and goodness displayed in the frame and government of 
the world. These are proper objects of admiration and joy. It is not agreeable to the 
ordinary course of nature, that m an should be endued with an affection, without having 
a proper object to bestow it upon. And as the providence of the Deity is the highest 
object of this affection, it would be unnatural, that m an should be kept in ignorance of it. 
(EPM, 205)
We are so constituted, says Kames, that we take delight in order, regularity, 
and harmony. The ‘ sensitive branch ’ of our nature ‘ fits ’ us for appreciating these 
features of the universe, both locally (in particular animals, for example) and 
globally (in the laws of nature). If these features were absent, or too much 
diminished, our natural propensity to respond to them would find itself without 
any object. Such a situation would be analogous to one in which an animal 
possessed a com plex organ, such as an eye, yet lived in an environment that 
lacked visual properties. The best candidate for a proper object of our ‘taste for 
beauty, regularity, and order’ is the providential order of things. Therefore, 
Kames concludes, it would be ‘unnatural’ for there not to be such an order and 
for us to be unapprised of it.
But how is it that we com e to recognize the providential order of the 
universe? Here, the ‘sensitive branch’ once more plays the key explanatory role 
in Kames’s account. We discover the existence of God ‘not by any process of 
reasoning, but by the light of nature. The Deity hath not left his existence to be 
gathered from slippery and far-fetched arguments. We need but open our eyes, 
to receive impressions of him almost from every thing we perceive’ (EPM, 207). 
That is, the very same part of our nature that ‘ fits ’ us to appreciate order and 
regularity in the universe also makes possible cognitive access to the same global 
features of the world. Just as we have cognitive access to moral properties
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of actions and characters through a ‘moral sen se’, so too our ‘sensitive’ natures 
make it possible for us to perceive properties of the world that are fitting objects 
of our admiration.
This account remains in place throughout Kames’s career, reappearing 
over two decades later in SHM. Unperturbed by Hum e’s doubts, Kames still 
acknowledges the virtual universality of religion in human culture (SHM, 791).14 
‘A conviction so universal and so perm anent’, he avers, ‘cannot proceed from 
chance; but must have a cause operating constantly and invariably upon all m en  
in all ages’ (SHM, 791). After considering, and ultimately rejecting, both a Humean 
fear-based explanation and a rationalist explanation that appeals solely to con­
viction on the basis of argument, Kames concludes that the only remaining 
option is that ‘the image of the Deity must be stamp’d upon the mind of every 
human being, the ignorant equally with the knowing’ (SHM, 794-795).
This way of putting the matter is, however, potentially misleading. The 
Cambridge Platonists in the seventeenth century, who in many ways anticipate 
the sentimentalist tradition, largely held that the idea of God is innate. Lord 
Herbert of Cherbury, another crucial figure in the formation a m odem  under­
standing of religious phenomena, held the same sort of position. Kames, how­
ever, follows Locke and Hutcheson in their resolute empiricism .15 Thus, what is 
innate is not so m uch the idea of God, but rather the capacity, rooted in the 
‘sensitive branch’ of our nature, to form this idea by responding to various fea­
tures of our environment. Kames holds, therefore, that ‘ the original perception 
we have of Deity, must proceed from an internal sense, which may be termed the 
sense o f  D eity’ (SHM, 795). Indeed, in SHM, Kames insists that this ‘ sense of D eity’ 
is ‘quiescent’ until appropriate features of the world trigger a cognitive-cum- 
affective response (SHM, 797).
This position makes it possible for Kames to go on to present a developmental, 
historicist account of religion that, in this respect, parallels his work in the 
philosophy of law. This approach forms the guiding idea behind SHM. Beginning 
with a basic conception of the instinctual capacities of human nature, Kames 
examines the development of commerce, the arts, the material condition of 
society, political constitutions, logic, morality, and, of course, religion. With 
respect to religion, Kames is willing to grant that there is som e elem ent of truth to 
H um e’s Lucretian observations about the influence of fear on the opinions of 
‘savages’. Yet, by Kames’s lights, the idea that fear alone suffices to explain re­
ligion is contravened by the evident progress of religious ideas, which has often 
occurred alongside and in interaction with improvements in the sciences 
(SHM, 793).
‘Savages’, however, do provide an important case study for understanding 
the origins of religion in human nature. Relating the travel report of a Danish 
missionary in Greenland, Kames observes that, while the indigenous people 
possessed a number of articulate and sophisticated religious ideas, they nowhere
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appealed to a posteriori philosophical arguments (SHM, 793-794)- The important 
lesson that Kames draws from this is the following: ‘It may be added with great 
certainty, that could they be made in any degree to conceive such reasoning, 
yet so weak and obscure would their conviction be, as to rest there without 
moving them to any sort of w orship’ (SHM, 794). What this implies is that, even 
in ‘civilized’ states of society, religion, which clearly involves worship, is neither 
fundamentally nor exclusively a product of reason.
T h e  ra tio n a lity  o f th e ‘ sen sitive  b r a n c h ’
So far I have argued that Kames shares with Hume the ideas that human  
beings are primarily creatures of affect and sensibility and that these features of 
our nature best explain religion. But Kames also differs from Hume in that he 
wants to defend religion precisely because it issues from the ‘sensitive branch’ of 
our nature. Unlike, say, the emotivists of the twentieth century (many of whom  
enthusiastically appropriated H um e’s ideas), Kames does not share the assum p­
tion that if a phenom enon is primarily an emotional response, it is therefore 
irrational and unworthy of serious consideration as an instance of genuine cog­
nition. Kames is, however, sensitive to the near-ubiquity of this assumption, and 
of the difficulties it might pose for the sort of account of religion that he provides. 
In EPM, he notes that one might express the concern that ‘To substitute sense in 
place of reason and demonstration, may seem  to put the evidence of the Deity 
upon too low a footing’ (EPM, 212). This reservation is, however, based simply on  
the fact that ‘Human reason is com m only overvalued by philosophers’ (EPM, 
212). This is a sentim ent that Hume would no doubt have shared. Nevertheless, in 
seeking to curb what he views as the pretensions of reason, particularly with 
respect to religion, Kames is not committed to relegating religion to the domain 
of irrationality. To understand why this is so requires a reconstruction of his 
overall account of the ‘sensitive branch’ of human nature. Karnes’s account of 
the rationality  of the ‘sensitive branch’ begins to take shape, not surprisingly, in 
EPM. The core features of this account survive this early period, reappearing in 
the EC a decade later. In EC, however, significant new elem ents are added to the 
account. Both will be considered in what follows.
The heart of Karnes’s account is a functional-teleological explanation of the 
‘sensitive branch’ that shares som e features with both the classical tradition 
and with som e of his immediate predecessors in the sentimentalist tradition. 
Consider, for example, what Francis H utcheson has to say about the moral sense 
in his Essay on the Nature and Conduct o f  the Passions:
Our moral Sense shews this to be the highest Perfection of our Nature; w hat we may 
see to be the End or Design of such a Structure, and consequently what is requir’d of 
us by the Author of our Nature: and therefore if any one like these Descriptions better, 
he may call Virtue, with many of the Antients, ‘ Vita secundum naturam ; ’ or ‘ acting
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according to w hat we may see from the Constitution of our Nature, we were intended 
for by our Creator’.16
The moral sense apprises us of our place in the providential order of the 
universe, as well as of the characteristic ends of our nature. In doing so, it evi­
dently assists us in realizing these ends and thereby ‘ fitting’ into the providential 
order. This position clearly travels together with a kind of moral naturalism  
reminiscent of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. As Kames makes clear in 
EPM, he shares this outlook. Moral precepts are, he maintains, ‘to be derived 
from the com m on nature of man, of which every person partakes who is not a 
m onster’ (EPM, 25). Or, as he puts it a bit further on: ‘In a word, it is according to 
order, that the different sorts of living creatures should be governed by laws 
adapted to their peculiar nature. We consider it as fit and proper that it should 
be so; and it is beautiful to find creatures acting according to their nature’ 
(EPM, 25).
This naturalistic perspective also appears in EC, suggesting that it is a stable 
feature of Kames’s philosophical view:
We have a sense of a comm on nature in every species of animals, particularly in our 
own; and we have a conviction that this comm on nature is right, or perfect, and that 
individuals ought to  be made conformable to it. To every faculty, to every passion, 
and to every bodily member, is assigned a proper office and a due proportion ... : if a 
passion deviate from the com m on nature, by being too strong or too weak, it is also 
wrong and disagreeable: but as far as conformable to comm on nature, every emotion 
and every passion is perceived by us to be right, and as it ought to be; and upon 
that account it m ust appear agreeable. (EC, 79)
Crucially, it is a ‘ sense ’ that apprises us of the natures of things and of their place 
in the providential order. In EPM, Kames follows H utcheson in ascribing this 
office to the ‘moral sen se ’ in particular (EPM, 41). The ‘moral sen se ’ is just our 
capacity for a cognitive-cum-affective response to actions that accord with ‘laws 
which are fitted to the nature of man, and to his external circum stances’ (EPM, 
30). This is the source of Kames’s objection to Clarke; reason may indeed help us 
to grasp essential relations, but it cannot account for our approval of actions that 
correspond with these relations (EPM, 69).
The ‘moral sen se ’, however, is merely a specification of a m uch broader 
capacity to discern what befits our nature and our ‘ situation on this earth ’: ‘ That 
m an is finely adjusted internally as well as externally to his situation on this earth, 
is made evidence from a thousand instances’ (EPM, 128). It is, first and foremost, 
the ‘sensitive branch’ of our nature that accounts for this fineness of fit. In es­
sence, then, our sensibility is that part of our nature that allows us to pursue our 
characteristic ends, and so to play our allotted role in the providential schem e of 
the universe. What applies in this instance to the moral sense applies, m utatis 
mutandis, to our capacity for religious responses to the world. As Kames puts it 
elsewhere, ‘Every thing must appear gloomy, dismal, and disjointed without a
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Deity to unite this world of beings into one beautiful and harmonious system ’ 
(EPM, 204). In this sense, the ‘sensitive branch’ is rational in that it serves a 
crucial role in the rational order of nature designed and executed by God. If one 
were to occupy, per impossibile, the standpoint of God prior to the act of creation, 
one would see the prudence of including a ‘ sensitive branch ’ in human nature.
Kames’s EC continues the functional-teleological account developed in EPM. 
However, Kames also includes new arguments meant to vindicate the rationality 
of the ‘ sensitive branch ’. EC is obviously primarily concerned with aesthetics and 
rhetoric. However, in a move that later drew appreciative acknowledgment from 
J. G. Herder, Kames also maintains that aesthetics (or ‘criticism ’, as he and his 
contemporaries called it) serves as a kind of entree into the development of a 
complete philosophical account of the ‘sensitive branch’ of human nature.17 
Moreover, the ultimate goal of Kames’s lengthy examination is to arrive at a 
‘ standard of taste ’, i.e. a normative criterion for aesthetic judgements. In the final 
chapter of EC, he firmly rejects relativism or subjectivism about aesthetic judge­
ments (EC, 720- 722). This obviously com m its him  to the claim that our affective 
responses can be rationally assessed.
In introducing his topic, Kames argues that aesthetic responses play a crucial 
role in helping human beings to achieve the characteristic ends of human nature:
Thus the author of nature, by qualifying the hum an mind for a succession of enjoyments 
from low to high, leads it by gentle steps from the most groveling corporeal pleasures, 
for which only it is fitted in the beginning of life, to those refined and sublime 
pleasures that are suited to its m atu rity . . . .  (EC, 13)
These ‘refined and sublime pleasures’ are none other than those of morality 
and religion, the capacity for which Kames has elsewhere identified as the dis­
tinguishing mark of human nature. In helping us to thus achieve our natural 
ends, taste, or the capacity for aesthetic responses, is allied to the ‘moral sen se’, 
the functional role of which Kames left in no doubt in the earlier EPM (EC, 13). 
Kames states his general perspective quite clearly later in the text:
The beauty of contrivance, so conspicuous in the hum an frame, is not confined to the 
rational parts of our nature, but is visible over the whole. Concerning the passions in 
particular, however irregular, headstrong, and perverse in a slight view, they may appear, 
I hope to demonstrate, that they are by nature modeled and tem pered with perfect 
wisdom, for the good of society as well as for private good. (EC, 131)
The ‘sensitive branch’ serves to ‘fit’ us into our environments in a variety of 
important ways. For example, our complex array of both ‘selfish’ and ‘social’ 
passions makes it possible for us to participate in society (EC, 41). Even more 
violent passions, such as fear and anger, ‘answer the purposes of nature’ (EC, 62).
As in EPM, Kames here delegates a crucial role to the ‘sensitive branch’ in 
attuning us to the requirements of our own natures. The ‘sense of propriety’, 
which Kames regards as a species of ‘congruity’, is what leads us to regard
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‘temperance, modesty, firmness of m ind’ and other such traits as duties that 
‘respect ourselves’ (EC, 241- 242). He explains this point as follows:
It is undoubtedly the interest of every man, to suit his behaviour to the dignity of his 
nature, and to the station allotted him by Providence; for such rational conduct 
contributes in every respect to happiness, by preserving health, by procuring plenty, 
by gaining the esteem of others; and, which of all is the greatest blessing, by gaining a 
justly-founded self-esteem. (EC, 242)
At the same time, as he had argued forcefully in EPM, Kames once again argues 
that reason alone cannot be relied upon to achieve these ends. Hence, God ‘ hath 
fortified us with natural laws and principles’ (EC, 242).
This functional-teleological account of the ‘sensitive branch’ is also what 
grounds Kames’s contention that em otions and passions can be rationally 
assessed. I have already quoted above Kames’s com m ents on our ‘sense of a 
com m on nature’ as the root of this important contention (EC, 79)- Kames’s point 
here is that our judgement of the ‘fitness’ or ‘propriety’ of various affective 
responses is based upon a prior appreciation of the function that the relevant 
faculties are intended to play. Importantly, this prior appreciation is attributed 
not (or at least not solely) to reason, but to a ‘ sense ’. Even when it is som e aspect 
of the ‘sensitive branch’ that is being evaluated, it is also the ‘sensitive branch’ 
itself that cues us to the relevant criterion.
In EC, however, Kames supplem ents this basic functional-teleological account 
with one that both highlights the role of em otions and passions in initiating and 
framing cognition, and interprets these responses as themselves fundamentally 
cognitive in nature. Emotions such as surprise and wonder direct our attention to 
novelty, pique our curiosity, and thus initiate cognitive processes. The pleasure 
we take in simplicity and congruity also accounts for the central role of theorems, 
generalizations, and heuristics in both daily experience and in science. Finally, 
the em otions themselves give us access to properties of states of affairs of which 
we would otherwise be unapprised.
To begin with this last point, Kames notes that all em otions and passions have 
causes in ‘circum stances’, i.e. in objective states of affairs (EC, 33)- But, for this 
to be possible, these states of affairs cannot be ‘indifferent’, rather they must 
‘antecedently’ have the sorts of features that render them  agreeable or dis­
agreeable (EC, 33- 34)- Thus, objects or states of affairs im m ediately  arouse our 
em otions ‘by m eans of their properties and qualities’ (EC, 34)- In other words, 
em otions cue us to relevant features of the world that are in som e sense really 
part of the world, independently of our responses to them.
In addition to being properly cognitive in themselves, em otions also serve 
to initiate other sorts of cognition. Kames makes this point in a discussion of 
curiosity:
The connection that m an hath with the beings around him, requires some 
acquaintance with their nature, their powers, and their qualities, for regulating his
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conduct. For acquiring a branch of knowledge so essential to our well-being, motives 
alone of reason and interest are not sufficient: nature hath providently superadded 
curiosity, a vigorous propensity, which never is at rest. This propensity attaches 
us to every new object; and incites us to compare objects, in order to discover their 
differences and resemblances. (EC, 197)
Here, Kames is arguing a point familiar from EPM, viz. that without the operation 
of the ‘sensitive branch’ (in this case, emotions), our cognitive life would be 
significantly impoverished. The ‘sensitive branch’ initiates other cognitive ac­
tivities, and Kames expresses doubts as to whether these would ever get off the 
ground without this impetus.
Moreover, Kames elsewhere maintains that the sorts of features of the environ­
ment to which the ‘sensitive branch’ gives us access facilitate our cognitive 
activities. For example, ‘ regularity, uniformity, order, and simplicity contribute 
each of them  to readiness of apprehension; enabling us to form more distinct 
images of objects, than can be done with the utm ost attention where these par­
ticulars are not found’ (EC, 144- 145). In a similar manner, the pleasure we receive 
from considering these sorts of regularity contributes to the higher reaches of 
cognition, i.e. the sciences. ‘General theorem s’, notes Kames, ‘are delightful by 
their simplicity, and by the easiness of their application to variety of cases. We 
take equal delight in the laws of motion, which, with the greatest simplicity, are 
boundless in their operations’ (EC, 147).
In addition to playing a key role in cognition, which, for Kames, is evidence 
of the solicitude of the ‘Author of nature’, the ‘sensitive branch’ is also central 
to action. He observes that ‘with respect to the endless variety of objects that 
owe their beauty to art and culture, the perception of beauty greatly promotes 
industry; being to us a strong additional incitem ent to enrich our fields and im ­
prove our manufactures’ (EC, 149). Like Hume, Kames regards the passions as 
conditions for the possibility of rational action. He defines passions as em otions 
that are ‘accompanied with desire’ (EC, 36). An emotion, on the other hand, 
‘ passeth away without desire ’, and so plays a more indirect role in motivation 
(EC, 37).
Kames brings out this distinction further on in the discussion, where he 
maintains that while both em otions and passions have causes, only the latter 
have objects (EC, 38). Objects can either be ‘general’, such as ‘fame, esteem, 
opulence’, or particular, such as ‘a man, a house, a garden’ (EC, 38). Having 
put this machinery in place, Kames goes on to distinguish an action from an 
instinctual response by noting that the former possesses a teleological structure,
i.e. is characterized by an intentional object. Thus,
A passion when it flames so high as to impel us to act blindly w ithout any view to 
consequences, good or ill, may in that state be term ed instinctive; and when it is so 
m oderate as to adm it reason, and to prom pt actions with a view to an  end, it may in that 
state by term ed deliberative. (EC, 39)
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In other words, rational agency (i.e. acting for a reason) is only possible for 
creatures with deliberative passions.
C o n clu sio n
I have shown above how Kames is committed to two related theses: (1) 
that human beings are fundamentally creatures of passion and sensibility, and 
that (2) this ‘ sensitive branch ’ o f our nature explains religion. Decades before 
Schleiermacher famously defined religion as the ‘ sense and taste for the infinite ’, 
and long before his disciple Rudolf Otto identified the features of the ‘ num inous’ 
that call forth religious responses, Kames outlined a theory of religion that roots it 
firmly in our sensibility. His EPM  anticipates H um e’s well-known N atural History 
o f Religion by half a decade.
More importantly, Kames does not accept the assumption that this sort of 
account of religion com m its him  to the idea that religion is fundamentally 
irrational. On the contrary, he develops a sophisticated account of the rationality 
of the ‘sensitive branch’ of human nature. The fundamental framework of this 
account is a functional-teleological picture on which the ‘ sensitive branch ’ plays 
the key role in ‘fitting’ us to nature, to society, and to the characteristic ends 
of our own nature. Moreover, the ‘sensitive branch’, which includes emotion, 
passion, appetite, affection, and desire, both initiates and frames cognition and 
enables us to act in identifiably rational ways. Religion, for Kames, is at bottom  
a cognitive-cum-affective response to the world, a recognition of the order 
of nature that arouses admiration, wonder, and gratitude. To locate the roots of 
religion in this part of human nature is afford it an important functional role in 
the development, maintenance, and perfection of human life.18
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